Hacking Secure Software Update Systems at the DEF CON 32 Car Hacking Village
Read about Red Balloon's CTF at DEF CON 32's Car Hacking Village, highlighting secure software updates.
Two weeks ago, Red Balloon Security attended DEF CON 31 in Las Vegas, Nevada. In addition to sponsoring and partnering with the Car Hacking Village, where we showed off some of our latest creations, we contributed two challenges to the Car Hacking Village Capture the Flag (CTF) competition. This competition was a “black badge CTF” at DEF CON, which means the winners are granted free entrance to DEF CON for life.
Since it’s been a little while since DEF CON ended, we figured we’d share a write-up of how we would go about solving the challenges. Alternatively, here is a link to an OFRAK Project (new feature since OFRAK 3.2.0!) that includes an interactive walkthrough of the challenge solves.
Description: Find the flag inside the firmware, but don’t get tricked by the conn man, etc.
CTF participants start off with a mysterious, 800MB binary called ivi.bin. The description hints that the file is firmware of some sort, but doesn’t give much more info than that. IVI is an acronym for “In Vehicle Infotainment,” so we expect that the firmware will need to support a device with a graphical display and some sort of application runtime, but it is not yet clear that that info will be helpful.
To begin digging into the challenge, the first thing we do is to unpack the file with OFRAK. Then, we load the unpacked result in the GUI for further exploration.
# Install OFRAK
python3 -m pip install ofrak ofrak_capstone ofrak_angr
# Unpack with OFRAK and open the unpacked firmware in the GUI
ofrak unpack --gui --backend angr ./ivi.bin
When the GUI opens, we see that the outermost layer that has been unpacked is a GZIP. By selecting the only child of the GZIP in the resource tree, and then running “Identify,” we can see that OFRAK has determined that the decompressed file is firmware in Intel Hex format.
Luckily, OFRAK has an Intel Hex unpacker built-in, so we can unpack this file to keep digging for the flag.
OFRAK unpacks the Ihex into an IhexProgram. At this point, we’re not sure if what we’re looking at is actually a program, or is a file that can unpack further. Looking at the metadata from OFRAK analysis in the bottom left pane of the GUI, we note that the file has only one, large segment. This suggests that it is not a program, but rather some other file packed up in IHEX format.
If we run “Identify” on the unpacked IhexProgram, OFRAK confirms that the “program” is actually GZIP compressed data.
To gather more information, we can make OFRAK run Binwalk analysis. This will happen automatically when clicking the “Analyze” button, or we can use the “Run Component” button to run the Binwalk analyzer manually.
Binwalk tends to have a lot of false positives, but in this case, it confirms that this resource is probably a GZIP. Since we know this, we can use the “Run Component” interface to run the GzipUnpacker and see what is inside.
Running “Identify” on the decompressed resource shows that there was a TAR archive inside. Since OFRAK can handle this easily, we click “Unpack” on the TAR. Inside of the archive, there are three files:
qemu.shbzImageagl-ivi-demo-platform-html5-qemux86-64.ext4
The first file is a script to emulate the IVI system inside QEMU. The second file is the kernel for the IVI system. And the third file is the filesystem for the IVI.
Based on the bzImage kernel, the flags for QEMU in the script, and the EXT4 filesystem format, we can assume that the IVI firmware is Linux-based. Moreover, we can guess that AGL in the filename stands for “Automotive Grade Linux,” which is a big hint about what type of Linux applications we’ll encounter when we delve deeper.
Since the description talks about “conn man” and “etc,” we have a hint that it makes sense to look for the flag in the filesystem, instead of the kernel.
OFRAK has no problem with EXT filesystems, so we can select that resource and hit “Unpack” to explore this firmware further.
From here, there are two good paths to proceed. The easiest one is to use OFRAK’s new search feature to look for files containing the string flag{, which is the prefix for flags in this competition.
The second is to notice that in the hint, it mentions etc and connman, both of which are folders inside the AGL filesystem.
Navigating into the /etc/connman folder, we see a file called flag1.txt. Viewing this gives us the first flag!
flag{unp4ck_b33p_b00p_pack}
Description: IVe heard there is a flag in the mechanic area, but you can’t decrypt it without a password… Right?
The hint provided with the challenge download makes it clear that this second challenge is in the same unpacked firmware as the first one. As such, the natural first step is to go looking for the “mechanic area” to find the flag.
One option is to use the qemu.sh script to try and emulate the IVI. Then it might become apparent what the description means by “mechanic area.” However, this is not necessary if you know that “apps” for Automotive Grade Linux are stored in /usr/wam_apps/<app name> in the filesystem.
Navigating directly to that directory, we can see that there is an app called html5-mecharea. One subdirectory of that folder is called chunks, and contains many files with the name flag.XXX.png. This is a pretty good hint that we’re on the right track.
The only problem is that if we try to view any of those PNG files, they appear corrupted.
Poking around the folder a bit more, we see two useful files: create.go, and app/src/App.svelte. It looks like create.go was used to break an image with the flag into chunks, and then encrypt them separately. App.svelte is responsible for taking a password from a user, and using that to try and decrypt the chunks into a viewable image.
create.go seems to be a Golang program to generate a (truly) random password string, use PBKDF2 to generate an AES key from the password, generate a truly random IV, break an image into 1024-byte chunks, encrypt each chunk with AES in OFB mode using the same key and IV, and then dump the encrypted chunks to disk.
Similarly, App.svelte does the inverse process: get a passphrase from a user, do PBKDF2 key derivation, load chunks of an image and try to decrypt them, then concatenate and display the decrypted result.
Looking at these two source files, it’s not apparent that the implementation of randomness or the crypto functions themselves are unsafe. Instead, the most eyebrow-raising aspect (as hinted by the challenge description and title) is the reuse of the same key and Initialization Vector for every chunk of plaintext.
In the OFB mode of AES, the key and IV are the inputs to the AES block cipher, and the output is chained into the next block. Then all of the blocks are used as the source of randomness for a one-time pad. Specifically, they are XORed with the plaintext to get the ciphertext. In other words, the same key and IV generate the same “randomness,” which is then XORed with each plaintext chunk to make a ciphertext chunk.
One fun feature of the XOR function is that any value is its own inverse under XOR. The XOR function is also commutative and associative. This means that the following is true if rand_1 == rand_2, which they will be because the same key and IV generate the same randomness:
cipher_1 XOR cipher_2 == (plain_1 XOR rand_1) XOR (plain_2 XOR rand_2)
== (plain_1 XOR plain_2) XOR (rand_1 XOR rand_2)
== (plain_1 XOR plain_2) XOR 0000000 ... 0000000
== plain_1 XOR plain_2
To reiterate: the resuse of the same key and IV tell us that the rand_N values will be the same for all of the ciphertexts. This tells us that the result of XORing any two ciphertexts together (when the same key and IV are used in OFB mode) is the two plaintexts XORed together.
Luckily, based on a closer inspection of the source, one of the chunks is saved unencrypted in the chunks folder. This is used in the code for determining if the passphrase is correct, and that the beginning of the image was successfully decrypted. But we can use it to XOR out the resulting parts of the plaintext. Therefore, we are able to do the following for every ciphertext chunk number N to eventually get back all of the plain text:
plain_1 XOR cipher_1 XOR cipher_N == plain_1 XOR (plain_1 XOR plain_N)
(by above reasoning)
== (plain_1 XOR plain_1) XOR plain_N
== 00000000 ... 00000000 XOR plain_N
== plain_N
The last step is to write a little code to do this for us. A simple solution in Golang is included below, but should be straightforward to do in your favorite programming language.
package main
import (
"crypto/aes"
"crypto/subtle"
"os"
"sort"
)
func main() {
outfile, _ := os.Create("outfile.png")
os.Chdir("chunks")
chunkdir, _ := os.Open(".")
filenames, _ := chunkdir.Readdirnames(0)
sort.Strings(filenames)
var lastEncrypted []byte = nil
lastDecrypted, _ := os.ReadFile("flag.unencrypted.png")
for _, filename := range filenames {
if filename == "flag.unencrypted.png" {
continue
}
data, _ := os.ReadFile(filename)
encryptedData := data[aes.BlockSize:]
xorData := make([]byte, len(encryptedData))
if lastEncrypted != nil {
outfile.Write(lastDecrypted)
subtle.XORBytes(xorData, encryptedData, lastEncrypted)
subtle.XORBytes(lastDecrypted, lastDecrypted, xorData)
}
lastEncrypted = encryptedData
}
outfile.Write(lastDecrypted)
outfile.Close()
}
When we do this and concatenate all of the plaintexts in the right order, we get a valid PNG image that contains the flag.
flag{cr4sh_syst3ms_n0t_c4rs}
In the meantime, we published OFRAK 3.2.0 to PyPI on August 10!
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As always, a detailed list of changes can be viewed in the OFRAK Changelog.
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We’ve had several new features and quality of life improvements since our last major release.
OFRAK 3.2.0 introduces OFRAK Projects. Projects are collections of OFRAK scripts and binaries that help users organize, save, and share their OFRAK work. Acessable from the main OFRAK start page, users can now create, continue or clone an OFRAK project with ease. With an OFRAK Project you can run scripts on startup, easily access them from the OFRAK Resource interface, and link them to their relavent binaries. Open our example project to get started and then share your projects with the world, we can’t wait to see what you make!
OFRAK 3.2.0 also introduces a long awaited feature, search bars. Two new search bars are available in the OFRAK Resource interface, one in the Resource Tree pane, and one in the Hex View pane. Each search bar allows the user to search for exact, case insensitive, or regular expression strings and bytes. The Resource Tree search bar will filter the tree for resources containing the search query while the Hex View search bar will scroll to and itereate on the instances of the query. The resource search functionality is also available in the python API using resource.search_data.
ยฉ 2024 Red Balloon Security.
All Rights Reserved.
Sal Stolfo was an original founding member of Red Balloon Security, Inc.
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Reach out to learn more about our embedded security offering and to schedule a demo.
Reach out to learn more about our embedded security offering and to schedule a demo.
Reach out to learn more about our embedded security offering and to schedule a demo.
Reach out to learn more about our embedded security offering and to schedule a demo.
